James Madison University

JMU Scholarly Commons
Dissertations

The Graduate School

Summer 2012

Investigation of personal and collective mortality
threats in individualistic and collectivist cultures: A
cross cultural study.
Catherine Munns
James Madison University

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/diss201019
Part of the Psychology Commons
Recommended Citation
Munns, Catherine, "Investigation of personal and collective mortality threats in individualistic and collectivist cultures: A cross
cultural study." (2012). Dissertations. 68.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/diss201019/68

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the The Graduate School at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.

Investigation of personal and collective mortality threats in individualistic and collectivist
cultures: A cross cultural study.
Catherine Munns

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY
In
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Psychology

Combined-Integrated Program in Clinical and School Psychology

August 2012

Acknowledgements
This research was made possible through the support, cooperation and guidance
of several individuals. I am eternally grateful for the generous support provided by all of
my dissertation committee members who offed their valuable insight. First and foremost,
I would like to thank and acknowledge my adviser Dr. Gregg Henriques for his
challenge, flexibility, intellectual curiosity, and continuous support throughout the
doctoral program and with this research. To Dr. Craig Shealy, for his patience, astute
insight, broad perspective, support, and gentle guidance throughout the doctoral program
and the dissertation process. I would also like to thank another invaluable member of my
committee, Dr. Elena Savina for her help with data collection, her dedication, attention to
detail, and her expertise with cross-cultural work and Russian culture.
In addition, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my family and friends
for their balance, love, and encouragement. Finally, to my parents who instilled within
me the importance of education, for their inspiration and unwavering support, and for
always encouraging me to pursue my goals.

ii

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments .............................................................................................................. ii
List of Tables .................................................................................................................... iv
List of Figures ......................................................................................................................v
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. vi
I. Introduction ....................................................................................................................1
II. Literature Review of Terror Management Theory.........................................................4
The Denial of Death .....................................................................................6
TMT: Empirical Formulation and Analysis of Becker’s Formulation ........7
Effects of MS on In-group Favoritism and Out-group Bias ......................11
The Proximal and Distal Mechanisms of Defense .....................................13
Moderating Variables.................................................................................15
Limitations and Critiques ...........................................................................20
Examining TMT Across Cultures ..............................................................21
The Current Study ......................................................................................24
III. Methodology ................................................................................................................27
IV. Results ..........................................................................................................................37
V. Discussion ....................................................................................................................51
VI. Appendices ...................................................................................................................65
Appendix A: Measure of Nationalism Identification.................................65
Appendix B: Rosenburg Self-Esteem Inventory........................................66
Appendix C: Level of Religiosity ..............................................................68
Appendix D: Positive and Negative Affect Scales ...................................69
Appendix E: Essay Samples ......................................................................72
Appendix F: Evaluation of Essay Author ..................................................73
VII.

References ..............................................................................................................75

iii

List of Tables

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for All Measures by Country with T-tests for
Differences. ...........................................................................................................38
Table 2 Means and Standard Deviations for All Measures for Overall
Sample by Condition. ...........................................................................................40
Table 3 Means and Standard Deviations for Worldview Defense Measures
for the American Sample by Condition. ...............................................................43
Table 4 Means and Standard Deviations for Worldview Defense Measures
for the Russian Sample by Condition. ..................................................................44

iv

List of Figures

Figure 1 Overview of the Study Procedure........................................................................33

v

Abstract
The purpose of this this study was to expand our knowledge of the ways in which people
defend their worldviews under conditions of threat. Within the framework of Terror
Management Theory (TMT), mortality salience (MS) in individualistic and collectivist
cultures was investigated. Specifically, this study sought to directly examine MS effects
as they relate to personal mortality and collective mortality. To accomplish this analysis,
a 2 (Country: Russia and the U.S.) X 3 (Condition: Personal Mortality Salience,
Collective Mortality Salience, and Control) design was employed. The current study
consisted of undergraduate student participants from two cultures: U.S. and Russia. The
overall sample consisted of 308 participants, consisting of 100 males and 208 females
(M = 19.44 years, SD = 2.19; academic level M = 2.14, SD = 1.15). The design of the
study followed a typical experimental TMT procedure. The Personal Mortality Salience
condition included an MS induction where participants were asked to describe the
thoughts that arise regarding their own death. The delay tasks including assessment of
affect, individualism-collectivism, followed by the worldview defense measure (author
evaluations of pro and anti-nationalistic essays). The Control condition differed only in
induction which asked participants to imagine a visit to a dentist’s office. An addition to
the typical procedure, a third condition Collective Mortality Salience, was included to
assess potential for differences in Personal (typical) or Collective Mortality Salience
compared to controls in individualistic and collectivistic cultures. The findings yielded no
significant results between the three conditions. Discussion of results including
limitations and future directions for research are examined.

vi

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
This project sought to extend the body of research on Terror Management Theory.
Terror Management Theory (TMT) (Greenberg, Pyszcznski & Solomon, 1986) is the idea
that death awareness is a central aspect of the human condition and that much of human
psychological organization is structured around managing the anxiety that results from
the human capacity to be aware of one’s ultimate demise. An examination of the world’s
great religions (e.g., Christianity, Islam) reveals many components and ideas that might
well be interpreted as potentially assuaging death anxiety. In 1973, in a highly influential
book, the existential and analytic author Ernst Becker wrote The Denial of Death, which
placed death anxiety at the core of human existence and attempted to articulate the many
different ways in which death anxiety might function and be coped with and defended
against.
TMT posits two main hypotheses: the mortality salience hypothesis and the selfesteem as an anxiety buffer hypothesis. The mortality salience hypothesis holds that
people when reminded of their mortality, will react more favorably towards others and
ideas that support and validate their cultural worldview and negatively towards others and
ideas that challenge or deviate from their worldview. Additionally, people will strive to
enhance their self-esteem to secure their self-worth as important and special in upholding
the cultural worldview and extending their symbolic immortality. The self-esteem
hypothesis claims that self-esteem acts as an anxiety buffer and that enhancement of selfesteem increases this buffer against anxiety and fear of death. Additionally, individuals
with high self-esteem are less likely to exhibit anxiety-related feelings and behaviors
(defensive reactions) when faced with actual or symbolic mortality
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TMT research has supported the above hypotheses, evidencing that reminders of
death affect social allegiances and intergroup hostilities based on cultural aspects such as
ethnicity (Castano, 2004; Motyl et al., 2011); race (Greenberg, Schimel, Martens,
Solomon, & Pyszcznski, 2001); political affiliation, and nationality (Jonas, Fritsche, &
Greenberg, 2005). Negative responses to reminders of death have included harsher
evaluations of others who challenge or threaten one’s worldview and positive evaluations
of those who support it, increased estimates of social consensus for ones’ worldview
(Pyszcznski et al., 1996), physical distancing, derogation and physical aggression against
those who criticize one’s worldview (McGregor et al., 1998, etc.).
Positive responses to mortality salience have included, among others: collective
helping behavior, greater generosity and donations to charities, (Jonas et al. 2002),
tolerance towards dissimilar others when the value of tolerance was highly accessible
(Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992), increased pacifist
tendencies when primed with pacifist norms (Jonas, Fristche, Greenberg, Martens, &
Niesta, 2006, cited in Niesta, Fristche, & Jonas 2008). TMT research includes other
responses that attempt discredit or reduce threats and increase the impact of support and
validation of ones’ worldview, but this is beyond the scope of this study.
Although a substantial body of research supports TMT, as evidenced by over 300
studies in 15 different countries, the majority of this research has focused on Western,
individualistic cultures. Only a few studies have investigated TMT phenomenon in
collectivistic cultures. If TMT is universal, which it purports to be, then examination of
TMT and its main hypotheses in non-Western, collectivistic cultures is essential.
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In the current study participants were undergraduate students from two different
cultures: the U.S. and Russia. The overall sample consisted of 308 participants, consisting
of 100 males and 208 females (M = 19.44 years, SD = 2.19; academic level M = 2.14, SD
= 1.15) were recruited via from campus and online student sample pool. The design of
the study followed a typical experimental TMT procedure. Mortality salience condition
which included induction with participants asked to describe the thoughts that arise
regarding their own death, delay tasks including assessment of affect, followed by
worldview defense measure (author evaluations of pro and anti-nationalistic essays).
Control condition differed only in induction which asked participants to imagine a visit to
a dentist’s office. An addition to the typical procedure a third condition collective
mortality salience induction was included to assess potential for differences in personal
(typical) or collective mortality salience compared to controls in individualistic and
collectivistic cultures. The findings yielded no significant results between the 3
conditions. Discussion of results including limitation and future directions for research
are examined.

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
On the morning of September 11, 2001 Americans (and the world at large) were
jolted out of their everyday routines with the remarkable and horrific news that several
airliners across the skies were hijacked and then used as missiles, destroying the Twin
Towers in New York and badly damaging the Pentagon, killing almost 3000 innocent
people. This world event provoked mass mortality salience, particularly in America, but
also internationally. Many aspects of the impact and aftermath of this event can be
accounted for by TMT. Negative reactions to this event included among others:
restrictions on civil liberties, increased political intolerance to various ethnic and
religious groups, increased political conservatism, prejudice, discrimination, and desire
for punishment, and displaced aggression towards others who were perceived as similar
to terrorists, and actual endorsement for violence against the perceived “enemies” of
one’s culture. Some of these responses were evidenced in increased Islamaphobia,
aggression and hostility towards Muslims and middle-eastern individuals. Increases in
hate crimes against Arab Americans, Muslims, and similar others (Singh, 2002). Some
positive responses to 9/11 were Americans united as citizens of their country, greater
patriotism, persistent and continued efforts to fortify faith in the American worldview and
its value (Landau et al., 2004; Kosloff, Solomon, Greenberg, et al., 2006). Americans
became closer to family and friends, but also to their fellow citizens (Ai, Cascio,
Santangelo, & Evans-Campbell, 2005). Other positive reactions included increase in
blood donations (Heinrich, 2002), and donation of time and money to charities (Niesta,
Fritsche, & Jonas, 2008; Morgan, 2011). Another reactions to 9/11 included increased
engagement and interest in politics (Ai et al, 2005; Putnum, 2002), and greater trust in
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both local and national government (Morgan, 2011). America’s support of the nation’s
leader increased following 9/11. President Bush’s popularity which had been relatively
low prior to the attack, skyrocketed following this event. TMT accounts for this response
by positing that leaders communicate an ability to provide security from threats, such as
an identifiable “evil” (e.g. terrorists) for one’s culture to strive against (Arndt & Vess,
2008). As part of the resultant aftermath of 9/11, America declared a “war on terror” and
aggressive efforts against terrorists and nations that were viewed as a threat to American,
intensified. Such behavior is not specific to the U.S. TMT research has shown that
reminders of death have been found to increase British individual’s reported willingness
to sacrifice themselves for their country (Routledge & Arndt, unpublished); Iranian’s
support for martyrdom attacks against the US; and American’s endorsement of radical
military action against countries that are perceived as a threat to the U.S. (Pyszczynski et
al. 2006). In sum, TMT has provided a useful framework from which to understand the
development of “good” versus “evil” ideologies and their contributions to aggressive and
violent conflicts and mitigating factors to peace processes throughout the world (Arndt
& Vess, 2008; Niesta, Fritsche, & Jonas, 2008).
Over the past three decades, TMT has been the focus of hundreds of studies, and
researchers have empirically documented that mortality salience results in changes in a
multitude of different domains including attitudinal changes and behaviors, ranging from:
derogation and/or punishment of moral transgressors or dissimilar others; increased
stereotypic thinking; increased patriotism; to self-esteem striving and increased prosocial
behavior (for summary see Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszcznski, 2004; Greenberg,
Solomon, & Pyszcznski, 1997). This review provides a brief overview of the history of
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the construct, key findings and domains, and proceeds to document why additional
research across cultures with differing worldviews are necessary. The objective of the
current study is to attempt to test the universality of TMT and extend the theory to nonWestern, collectivistic cultures.
The Denial of Death
Ernest Becker proposed that psychological needs are a consequence of the
existential dilemma that humans are confronted with. Like other animals, humans have
strivings for self-preservation and survival. Due to the advanced cognitive capabilities
that humans possess, humans are uniquely confronted with an existential crisis:
distressing conscious awareness of their inevitable death and their innate striving for
survival. This crisis causes an immense potential for debilitating anxiety, which must be
controlled and managed in order for us to go about our daily lives. By immersing
ourselves in a shared psychological construction that gives purpose and meaning in life,
and a sense of permanence, we are able to believe that our human existence is not
temporary but, can continue through symbolic immortality, hence death can be
transcended.
TMT is grounded is the theoretical and conceptual analysis of Ernst Becker
(1973), who theorized that this conflict creates overwhelming anxiety and threat of terror
(annihilation anxiety), and that humans engage in many defensive processes by which
they manage the potential disquietude.
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TMT: An Empirical Formulation and Analysis of Becker’s Formulation
Although Becker’s analysis of death anxiety had many compelling elements, it
was lacking much in the way of scientific analysis and demonstration. Specifically,
Becker presented limited experimental evidence that death anxiety resulted in the many
and varied defenses that he claimed. The social psychologists Sheldon Solomon, Tom
Pyszczynski, and Jeff Greenberg sought to advance Becker’s thesis by formulating it into
an empirical proposal that could be experimentally analyzed (Greenberg, Solomon, &
Pyszcznski, 1997).
Terror Management Theory (TMT) posits that humans are confronted with an
existential dilemma that arises out of the conflict between survival instincts and
awareness that eventual death is inevitable. TMT proposes a dual process model via
which death-related thoughts affect behavior (Pyszcznski, et al. 1999). When first
presented with reminders of death, conscious contemplation of mortality first arouses
direct proximal defenses, which include the suppression of death-related thoughts or
denial of the problem of mortality and one’s vulnerability by rationalizing various risk
factors (e.g. promising to engage in healthier behavior, increased risk taking, etc.). The
proximal defenses serve to push death-related thoughts from conscious awareness. Once
such thoughts are no longer in one’s consciousness, distal defensive processes are then
engaged. These distal defenses, which function to bolster faith in the cultural worldview
and one’s sense of self-worth, become activated to manage the potential for anxiety
brought about by heightened accessibility of implicit death-related thoughts. After these
defenses have been engaged, death-thought accessibility dissipates and recedes back to
baseline levels. To summarize, direct proximal defenses push death out of awareness, and
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it is the distal defenses (symbolic immortality) sustained perception of oneself as a person
of value in a world of meaning who upholds the worldview, that allows people to avert
the potential for anxiety that results from the increased accessibility of death-related
thoughts. TMT proposes that self-esteem and identification with a cultural worldview
both function as buffers against death anxiety. The underlying premise of TMT holds that
to manage the fear of death and be able to continue through our lives and daily affairs, we
consciously or sub-consciously strive to enhance and strengthen our self-esteem and
defend our cultural worldview and its associated beliefs and values.
Cultural worldviews are culturally shared beliefs that provide members with the
reassurance that they are part of an enduring entity; thus, worldviews are theorized to
offer a basis for reducing death anxiety via identification with a culture that will
transcend their mortality. Cultural worldviews provide an enduring value system and
concept of reality, which in turn helps facilitate individuals’ sense of personal value and
self-esteem. Self-esteem, according to TMT, is attained by the belief that one is meeting
the cultural standards and is a valuable participant in a meaningful universe, and as such
one is eligible for mortality transcendence (Greenburg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997).
Thus, individuals that believe they are meeting the standards of their worldview have
high self-esteem whereas individuals with low self-esteem perceive a failure in meeting
these standards. Self-esteem is crucial in death-related defensive processes in that high
self-esteem buffers people from the potential anxiety caused by death-thoughts, thus
reducing the threat of death and causing reduced need to defend one’s worldview
(Harmon-Jones, et al., 1997). The self-esteem that people achieve from adhering to their
cultural worldview instills a sense of value and uniqueness in their society. That is, they
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feel they are significant beings rather than merely a human whose only fate is ultimate
death (Greengburg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997).
Cultural worldviews are societal creations and require validation from other
humans in order to remain significant. Validation of one’s cultural worldview occurs
through behaving in accordance with the cultural worldview an individual possesses or
through other humans conveying positive feedback regarding one’s cultural worldview.
When other people validate one’s cultural worldview, this increases confidence in one’s
worldview and self-esteem and thus increases the effectiveness of these anxiety-buffering
mechanisms. In contrast, when validation of one’s cultural worldview does not occur,
when others disagree with one’s cultural worldview that is held or because people violate
its standards, confidence in one’s cultural worldview (and one’s self-esteem) diminishes.
Such diminishment in self-esteem can result in a decreased ability to protect oneself from
deeply rooted existential death anxiety (Greenburg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Pinel, et al.,
1993). Due to our inherent longing to feel significant, people respond positively to those
who reinforce their worldviews and negatively to those who oppose or threaten them.
Hence, TMT asserts that in an effort to protect oneself from death-related anxiety, people
aim to maintain and even enhance their self-esteem, faith, and beliefs in their cultural
worldview.
The above formulation results in implications and predictions that can be
empirically tested. Specifically, the argument from TMT is that reminders of one’s
inevitable death (mortality salience; MS) should result in increased tendencies toward
individuals supporting one’s worldview and greater rejection of those with alternative
worldviews. This occurs because people with different beliefs and values threaten the
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worldview one is invested in. Research has documented support for this prediction in
scores of studies.
One of the original tests of TMT was conducted by Rosenblatt, Greeenberg,
Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon (1989). In a series of experiments, municipal court
judges responded to questions regarding their own death (mortality salience induction)
and then were required to set bond for an alleged prostitute. The other half of the judges
did not receive reminders of their death prior to setting a bond. In support of TMT, the
judges who were exposed to the mortality salience induction set higher bonds for an
alleged prostitute. Thus, when mortality was made salient, individuals reacted more
harshly to these “moral transgressors” who threated one’s cultural worldview, and
engaged worldview defense.
Findings from this seminal study provided evidence that reminders of one’s own
death were associated with an increase in punishing those who transgressed one’s moral
values while increasing rewards for those who espoused one’s moral values. Since this
early study, TMT has been investigated in numerous ways. Although TMT researchers
have used a multitude of prompts to make thoughts about death more salient, one
frequently used method requires the participant to answer two open-ended questions
concerning their own death (e.g. Goldenberg, McCoy, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, &
Solomon, 2000). This method prompts the participant to 1) think about what will happen
to them as they physically die and 2) describe the emotions they are experiencing while
thinking about death. TMT asserts that this method facilitates extensive consideration of
mortality, such that death-related thoughts remain highly accessible after becoming
primarily subconscious. When the accessibility of these constructs is increased,

11
individuals will typically exhibit increased worldview defense. These mortality salience
effects have been found in response to a range of inductions, including both open-ended
and true-false questions about death (Rosentblatt et al., 1989), subliminal presentation of
the words “death” or “dead” (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, et al, 1997), exposure to
graphic videos of automobile accidents (Nelson, Moore, Olivettti, & Scott, 1997) or
videos of gory scenes (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994),
walking past a funeral home (Pyszczynski, Wicklund, et al., 1996), walking through a
cemetery (Jonas, Fritsche, & Greenburg, 2005), interviewing participants in close
proximity to a funeral home (Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002).
Research has shown that other aversive thoughts that engender fear/anxiety, such as those
of physical pain, taking an important exam, public speaking, social exclusion, do not
generate parallel effects (e.g. Arndt, et al., 1997, Shimel et al., 1999).
Several phenomena have been examined in depth through the lens of TMT and
researchers have closely investigated in-group favoritism/out-group bias, proximal and
distal mechanisms of defense against death anxiety.
The Effects of Mortality Salience on In-group Favoritism and Out-group Bias
Reminders of death have shown to result in mortality salience participants
derogation of an outgroup member who had belittled American culture more than an
outgroup member that had praised America (Greenburg et al., 1990). In Israel, Florian
and Mikulincer (1997) replicated this finding using a variety of moral transgressions,
consistently showing that when they were reminded of their own mortality individuals
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were more punitive towards people who engaged in moral transgressions that offended
their cultural worldviews.
Additionally, mortality salience has been shown to increase resistance to the
inappropriate use of cultural icons (Greeenburn, Porteus, Simon, Pyszczynski, &
Solomon, 1995). Specifically, mortality salience was associated with greater reluctance
and distress when participants were maneuvered into using a crucifix and the American
flag in an inappropriate manner (Greenberg, Simon, Partens, Pyszczynski & Solomon,
1995).
Mortality salience has been shown to lead to false consensus bias, or falsely
believing one’s attitudes are held by the majority of sociciety (Pyszczynski et al., 1996).
Furthermore, increased in-group bias has been attributed to mortality salience (HarmonJones, Greenberg, Solomon, & Simon, 1996), more pro-social behavior towards
individuals who praise or share one’s cultural worldview (Greenberg, Pyszczynski,
Solomon. et al., 1990; Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 2002), as well as
distancing and derogation of others who threaten one’s worldview (e.g. Greenberg et al.,
1994).
Effects of mortality salience aroused by three different components of the self
(personal, social, and human identities) on intergroup bias has also been examined.
Agustin (2009) exposed participants to one of four conditions: personal identity (personal
mortality salience induction via death by cancer; social identity (threat of bomb to self
and others); human identity (human race annihilation via meteor); control (strong
toothache). The meteor mortality salience induction was taken from Kashima et al.
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(2004) and is described later in the current study. Findings illustrated the smallest
difference in the evaluation of the ingroup versus outgroup occurred in the human
condition while the largest differences took place in the social identity condition,
followed by the personal identity condition and control condition. Thus, mortality
salience aroused by threats against our human identity reduced intergroup biases.
Research has also demonstrated that mortality salience increases in-group
favoritism, behavioral avoidance of out-group members, prejudice and stereotyping
(Ochsmann & Mathy, 1994). When people are reminded of their mortality, they look
more positively on others who have similar cultural beliefs and values (Greenberg et al.,
1990; Greenberg et al. 1997), and exhibit more negative perceptions of others who hold
opposing moral principles or who criticize their cultural worldviews (e.g. Arndt &
Greenberg, 1999; Florian & Mikulincer, 1997; Harmon-Jones, Greenberg, Solomon &
Simon, 1996; Rosenblatt et al., 1989).
The Proximal and Distal Mechanisms of Defense
According to TMT, there are two distinct modes of defense against the terror of
death. TMT research focuses on the psychological mechanisms typically used by people,
on a proximal (conscious) or a distal (subconscious, outside conscious awareness) level,
to buffer the anxiety produced from the awareness of one’s ultimate mortality
(Pyszczynski, Greeenburn, & Solomon, 1999). Death reminders and death-related
thoughts activate direct defenses to minimize the threat (proximal defense) that later
trigger symbolic cultural worldview and self-esteem validation defenses (distal defense).
According to TMT, conscious awareness of our mortality is managed via rational
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defensive strategies that entail either distracting oneself from death related thoughts or
using a variety of rationalizing cognitive distortions to distance oneself from the problem
of death and push it into the distant future by denying one’s vulnerability to anything that
might threaten one’s continued existence (Greengburg, Arndt, Simon, Pyszczynski, &
Solomon, 2000). However, when death-related thoughts are suppressed from conscious
awareness by the proximal defenses, the distal defenses must then act in order to maintain
the suppression and keep death-related thoughts and anxiety from returning to conscious
awareness. Distal defenses that defend against subconscious awareness of death include
the pursuit of self-esteem and faith in the cultural worldview, which TMT posits to
control death related concerns (Arndt, Goldenberg, Pyszczynski & Solomon, 2000). Thus
conscious encounters with death initiate proximal defenses directed at the elimination of
such thoughts from explicit awareness. Distal defenses are then activated in response to
death thoughts that are highly accessible, but not conscious. Accordingly, research has
shown that thoughts of death produce distinctly different behavioral effects depending on
whether they involve proximal or distal defenses. For instance, studies show that death
reminders in distal mode increased an interest in a variety of high-risk activities for men,
but not for women (Hirschberger, Florian, Mikulincer, Goldneberg & Pyszczynski,
2002), and decreased women’s interest in sun protection (Routledge, Arndt, &
Goldenberg, 2004). However, mortality salience induction in proximal mode to facilitate
participant’s awareness of death at the conscious level led high school students to report
smoking less frequently (Kain & Nelson, 2001), and increased women’s interest in sun
protection (Routledge et al., 2004). Research has supported the proposition that the
effects of mortality salience are greatest when they are accessible but not in focal
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consciousness. Greenberg, et al. 1994 conducted a series of studies in which they
manipulated intensity of mortality salience induction, delay times and distraction tasks.
These researchers found that both increased worldview defense and increased
accessibility of death-related thoughts emerged after a delay and distraction, suggesting
that MS defensive processes emerge when the problem of our mortality is highly
accessible, yet outside of consciousness.
Moderating Variables
Research has demonstrated that there are important individual differences that moderate
the size and nature of effects that follow mortality salience. Individual characteristics
that have been found to predict how individuals respond to mortality salience include age,
gender, political orientation, depression, etc. that moderate defensive responses to
reminders of mortality. Various studies have shown that age is negatively associated with
death fear; that is, the older one becomes, there is less fear of death (Fortner, Neimeyer,
& Rybarczyk, 2000; Gesser, Wong, & Reker, 1988; Maxfield et al., 2007; Rasmussen &
Brems, 1996). Addionally some results indicate a curvilinear trend, with death fear high
in young adults, highest in middle adulthood, and lowest in old age (Gesser, Wong, &
Reker, 1988), but no correlation was found between death fear and age in adults over 60
years of age (Fortner, Neimeyer, & Rybarczyk, 2000). Research has also found a
relationship between age and gender, with death anxiety peaking in both men and women
during their 20 and declining thereafter. However, women experienced a second
elevation in death anxiety during their 50s, but this was not evidenced in men (Ruccas,
Gatliff, Reece, & Spottswood, 2007).
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Gender differences have been found in some TMT studies. For example,
Taubman-Ben-Ari and Findler (2003) found that mortality salience led to higher
intentions to drive recklessly only among men who perceived driving as relevant to their
self-esteem. Fritsche and Jonas (2005) found that men and women differed in their
judgments of pro-women course proposals only under mortality salience conditions.
However, some TMT studies have shown women and men were similar defensive
reactions in response to mortality salience and no correlation with gender.
Perceptions of death and its meaning are connected to philosophical/religious
traditions of Buddhism, Confucianism, among others (Wu, Tang, & Kwok, 2002) and
differ among cultures. Within some religions, death is considered merely a transitional
state to a better existence. Individuals coming from such a perspective may experience
less death anxiety than individuals who adhere to a Christian belief system. One’s
religious beliefs have also been found to have a moderating effect on death anxiety
(Dechesne et al., 2003; Freidman & Rholes, 2008; Jonas & Fischer, 2006).
Another moderating variable that has been found to influence mortality salience
effects is political orientation. Pyszczynski, Abdollahi, Solomon, Greenberg, Cohen, and
Weise (2006) found that mortality salience increased worldview defense among political
conservatives, but not among political liberals, which suggests variations in the cultural
worldview or personal philosophy an individual adopts may influence how greatly
thoughts of death affect subsequent behavior and attitudes. Thus, particular personal
philosophies, with variations in their underlying beliefs and values, may systematically
influence the degree to which mortality salience has an effect on subsequent measures of
worldview defense (Pyszczynski, et al., 2006).
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Political conservatism has also been linked to another moderating variable,
nationalism. Research has shown that bolstering national pride is one manifestation of
worldview defense, and thus has been used as an outcome measure for mortality salience
effects. Kazen et al. (2005) conducted TMT research in Germany, a country whose
citizens often hold attitudes toward their nation that are negatively valued or ambivalent
(perhaps as a result of historical reasons). The results of two studies found that
individuals negatively evaluated national pride. However, action oriented individuals
(who are able to self-regulate) following mortality salience induction, changed their
attitude to a higher level of national pride. Participant’s self-esteem did not appear to be a
related factor.
Another study that provided support that mortality salience is associated with
national identity was conducted by Jonas, Fritsche & Greenberg (2005) also with German
participants. A series of two studies were conducted. Study 1 found that mortality
salience inductions led to a decreased liking of the new European currency compared to a
control condition, although attitudes toward the German Mark remained unchanged.
Study 2 also evidenced a decreased liking to the Euro for a sample of older subjects who
were interviewed in front of a cemetery, compared to subjects interviewed several blocks
away. Additionally, mortality salience participants exhibited a marginal liking of the
German Mark and a preference for German items over non-German items. A recent
study (Sekerdej & Kossowska, 2011) found nationalism as a moderating variable.
Examination of terrorist threat perception revealed that nationalism mediated the
relationship between perceived threat of terrorism and support for domestic policies
which limited civil liberties. Individuals higher on nationalism perceived the threat of
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terrorism as more serious than those who scored lower on nationalism. This contributed
to the former group’s approval of more restrictive policies such as the restriction of civil
liberties. People high on nationalism and conservatism were more prone to support
military actions as a counter-terrorism reaction. Conservatives (especially right-wing
conservatives) is associated with nationalism (Dekker et al. 2003) and political
conservatism has been correlated with greater death anxiety and fear of threat and loss
(Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Moreover, other studies have shown that
individuals higher nationalism tend to view the world as a dangerous place (Altemeyer,
1998). which may promote generalized anxiety (Sekerdej & Kossowska, 2011). This in
turn can contribute to a higher fear of change, or of death, which results in a greater
defense of one’s cultural worldview and a need to control those who might alter the
social order even if this results in restricting one’s own civil liberties.
Another moderating variable that has been studied is depression. Solomon,
Greenberg, and Pyszczynski (1991) indicated that because depressed individuals have
“tenuous faith” in their sense of self-worth and their cultural worldview, they may be
likely to engage in particularly strong worldview defense when reminded of their own
mortality. Many studies have supported their proposition. For example, Simon,
Greenberg, Harmon-Jones, , Solomon, and Pyszczynski (1996) conducted a series of
studies which found that sub-clinically depressed college students exhibited greater
preference for pro-U.S. foreign student than a foreign student who criticized the U.S.
(stronger worldview defense), compared to non-depressed college students. Additionally,
mildly depressed students showed stronger preference for attitudinally similar other, than
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non-depressed students, evidencing again that depressed individuals engaged in greater
worldview bolstering responses to mortality salience.
Self-esteem is seen as a vital resource in countering death anxiety and thus is an
important tenant in TMT. It is frequently viewed as an essential anxiety buffer that is
hypothesized to enhance one’s defenses against death awareness (Solomon, Greenberg,
and Pyszczynski, 2004). A number of early research studies supported this hypothesis
indicating that the elevation of self-esteem (by false personality or IQ feedback) resulted
in reducing self-reported anxiety in response to reminders of death and physiological
arousal when danger is expected (Greenberg et al., 1992). Consistent with this finding
was a study conducted by Harmon-Jones et al. (1997) which showed that individuals with
high trait self-esteem were associated with significantly reduced reactions to mortality
salience induction. Their worldview defenses did not increase compared to those low in
self-esteem. Related to this were studies showing a reduction of the effects of MS
regarding psychological resources related to high self-esteem, such as hardiness (Florian
et al., 2001) and secure attachment style (Mikulincer & Florian, 2000). In contrast,
deficits such as depression (Simon et al., 1996) and neuroticism (Goldenberg, et al.,
2000) appear to increase the reactions to MS. Research has shown that individuals mildly
depressed with associated low self-esteem expressed greater worldview defense
compared to non-depressed individuals. They were also more likely to engage in selfenhancement (Mikuliner and Florian, 2002; Goldenberg et al., 2000). More recent studies
(Routledge et al., 2010) have focused on the relationships among mortality salience, selfesteem, and psychological adjustment. Findings indicate that mortality salience increases
negative affect and anxiety as well as increasing social avoidance for individuals with
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low self-esteem, but not for individuals with high self-esteem. These results occurred
only when death-related thoughts were not given focal (immediate) attention. If
participants were given a distracting task after mortality salience induction (arousing
distal defenses) and then presented with a task to assess psychological dysfunction, then
the results indicated an increase in social avoidance. These results also lend support to the
dual-process model of defensive processes mentioned previously.
Limitations and Critiques
Despite an expansive body of research that supports TMT, several criticisms have
been directed at the theory. For instance, Proulx and Heine (2006) have argued that their
meaning making model can explain the effects of mortality salience. McGregor (2006)
has put forth the neurologically based notion to explain why people strongly identify with
ideologies and groups in response to threats such as mortality salience. One main
question regarding TMT research is the extent to which mortality salience creates terror
and/or existential uncertainty (Van den Bos, 2009). The creation of uncertainty/anxiety
around death (specifically what happens after death) has been provided as an alternative
explanation to the mortality salience effect. McGregor (2006) and Van den Bos (2009;
2011), and Hogg and colleagues (2011) all have argued that thoughts of death produce a
stronger identification and defensive reaction not because people are afraid of their
impeding demise, but rather because of the uncertainty surrounding death (how it will
occur, etc.). McGregor and Van den Bos argue that this uncertainty creates high anxiety,
and it is this anxiety that serves as the motivational factor for people to identify and
defend their groups and worldviews.
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In contrast to the above proposition, Pyszczynski and colleagues (2006) disagree
with the uncertainty theory and argue that it is the ultimate nature (inevitability) of death
that is most disturbing and serves to motivate people. Further, they claim that not all
types of uncertainty can cause anxiety. Thus, they argue that the construct of uncertainty
is too vague to be considered a reliable predictor of a specific behavior. TMT argues that
one’s cultural worldview alleviates concerns about death if people view their worldview
as consistent and believe that certain cognitions follow from others (Pyszczynski,
Greenburg, & Solomon, 1997). In support of this notion, research using a dissonance
paradigm found that motivation to reduce inconsistencies in one’s worldview increases
when death-thoughts are present (Friedman & Arndt, 2005). These researchers propose
that inconsistencies in behavior undermined a stable view of reality, and that mortality
salience increased the need to reduce this instability.
Examining TMT across cultures
TMT is grounded in a theory of human evolutionary adaptation, and thus by
implication, the human responses that it proposes that are associated with mortality
salience should be fairly universal and apply across a wide variety of cultures. Thus, in
order to test the universality of TMT, it is imperative to empirically validate results in
support of the theory cross-culturally. To date, cross-cultural TMT literature has
primarily focused on cultures that hold Western, individualistic orientations, including
the U.S., Italy, Germany, Israel and the Netherlands (Greenberg et al. 1997). Studies done
on each of these populations have indeed found that mortality salience increases one’s
adherence to cultural norms (e.g. Florian & Mikulincer, 1997; Rosenblatt et al. 1989) and
inclinations toward defending one’s national biases.
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Cross-cultural TMT research in collectivist cultures has been limited to date,
although a few studies have been done. For example, following a mortality salience
induction, Japanese participants became more critical of an essay writer who criticized
Japan, compared to a control group (Heine, Harihara & Niiya, 2002), providing some
support that defending one’s cultural worldview when one’s own mortality is made
salient generalizes to Japanese samples. Additionally, Tam, Chiu, and Lau (2007)
investigated TMT in China and found that MS condition evoked the typical worldview
defense in that they rated a worldview supporting interviewee more positively
(likeability, intelligence, strength of his arguments), relative to controls, providing some
evidence for robust mortality salience effects.
Ma-Kellams and Blascovish (2011) investigated divergent cultural responses to
mortality salience in European and Asian American cultures. These researchers
conducted a series of studies that examined mortality salience manipulation on attitudes
towards a person who violates cultural norms (first study) and attributions regarding the
plight of an innocent victim (second study). Overall findings evidenced European
Americans to engage in defensive reactions to defend the self and Asian Americans to
defend other people.
Not only is the majority of the TMT literature based on Western, individualistic
cultures, but the majority of TMT research has focused on personal mortality. In Western
cultures, ideas of the self as an individualistic, independent entity predominate (MaKellams & Blascovish, 2011; Markus & Kityama, 1991). Within this worldview, death is
viewed primarily as a threat to the self, and efforts to cope with death involve restoring
the self (Ma-Kellams & Blascovish, 2011). In collectivist cultures, a greater value is
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placed on the collective self. In such collectivistic cultures, the self is seen not as
independent entity, but rather as an entity tied to the collective. Specifically, with
interdependent self-construal (Markus & Kityama, 1991), the collective self is one whose
feelings, needs, and thoughts are tied to other people (Chenstova-Dutton & Tsai, 2010).
Thoughts of personal death may not be as anxiety provoking as a threat of collective
death and disintegration of social ties, which may induce greater death anxiety. Only one
study (Kashima, Halloran, Yuki, & Kashima, 2004) has directly examined the effects of
MS as it relates to personal mortality and collective mortality. Participants consisted of
students from Australia and Japan. The individual mortality salience condition followed
the tradition mortality salience induction which asked subjects to respond to the traditions
two questions about their own death. Kashima et al. (2004) introduced a novel condition:
collective mortality salience condition for which the induction asked subjects to imagine
everyone in their country being destroyed by a meteorite, then to respond to the following
two questions: “What will happen to you and the people in your country as when your
bodies die? What emotions does the thought of your death and the death of all the people
in your country arouse in you?” The control condition consisted of questions about a
neutral situation (watching T.V.). Results suggest preliminary evidence that collective
mortality has a greater influence than personal mortality in a collectivist culture (Japan).
Results indicated the mortality salience triggered the validation of cultural worldviews
and this effect was stronger for individuals with low self-esteem in both Australia and
Japan. Collective mortality salience induction had a greater effect than individual
mortality salience induction in Japan, which indicates that TMT may be linked to broader
socio-cultural factors, such as individualistic/collectivistic orientations.
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Cross-cultural studies reveal that cultures vary in specific beliefs, values and
views of self that they foster. Two patterns of beliefs and values and self-views are
religious affiliation and individualism/collectivism. The present study will primarily
focus on terror management theory and individualism/collectivism.
Cultures differ in their beliefs and explanations regarding death. One’s view of
death is influenced by religious-philosophical beliefs and values. Some religions propose
the continued existence of self in some form after death. Belief in an afterlife and/or
reincarnation has been shown to function as a buffer against death anxiety (Cheng, 1997).
Thus, religious traditions that hold different beliefs about death, may confer differential
responses when faced with the threat of mortality.
Current Study
The current study seeks to build on the existing literature to examine the effects of
personal mortality salience compared to collective mortality salience in cultures that are
predominately individualistic (U.S.) and collectivistic (Russia). To accomplish this
analysis, a 2 (Country) X 3 (Condition: Individual mortality salience, Collective
Mortality Salience, and Dentist Control) design was employed. Based on TMT theory
and the literature reviewed above, four specific predictions were made.
1. We predict that mortality salience will increase worldview defense compared
to a control condition, in both the United States and Russian samples. This
first prediction is derived from the existing literature that has shown mortality
salience leads to worldview defense. Specifically it is expected that mortality
salience will result in an increased preference for those who praise one’s
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country over those who criticize it, regardless of mortality salience type. Thus,
individuals are expected to experience more worldview defense in the
mortality salient condition than in a control condition (dental pain). The
indicator of worldview defense is attitudes regarding nationalistic essays, with
the prediction being that individuals in the mortality salience conditions will
rate the author of a pro-nation essay proportionally more favorably than the
author of an anti-nation essay.
2. The second prediction is that there will be a differential effect of collective
mortality salience and individual mortality salience for individuals from
different backgrounds. That is, for individuals from a collectivist worldview
(Russia), where the collective self may have more importance than the
individual self, the Collective mortality salience is predicted to have a greater
impact than Personal mortality salience on worldview defense, but that the
reverse of this will hold for individuals from a culture with an individualistic
orientation, as in the United States. This will be analyzed in two ways. First,
measures of individualistic versus communal orientations will be made to
confirm the presence of group differences between the two countries and then
the impact of the two mortality salience conditions for the two countries will
be compared. Second, we will examine whether the individualistic or
communal orientations had a moderating effect on the response to the
mortality salience conditions.
3. Consistent with the anxiety-buffer theory of self-esteem, a third hypothesis is
that higher self-esteem should reduce the need to engage in worldview
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defense, whereas individuals with low self-esteem would engage in greater
worldview defense. Thus we will test and predict a moderating influence of
self-esteem on the impact of mortality salience for both the Russian and
United States samples.
4. Finally, it is hypothesized that high religious fundamentalism should reduce
the need to engage in worldview defense, whereas low fundamentalism will
engage in more worldview defense in the mortality salience condition than in
the control condition.

CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

Participants
The overall sample consisted of 308 participants, drawn from two different
cultures: the U.S. and Russia. The US sample consisted of 172 participants, (M = 19.19
years, SD = 2.70; academic level M = 1.53, SD = .76), whose self-identified ethnicity
was Caucasian 83.7%, African American 5.8 %, Asian American 5.8 %, Other 3.5 %.,
Puerto Rican .6%, and Native American .6%. The Russian sample consisted of 136
participants, (M = 19.76 years, SD = 1.24; academic level M = 2.87, SD = 1.05). All
participants were 18 years of age or older. Participants’ self-identified ethnicity was
Russian 97.1%, Ukranian 1.5%, Armenian 0.7 %, and Belarusian 0.7%.
Participants in each sample were students from universities who mostly consisted
of undergraduate students currently enrolled in one or more psychology courses.
Participants in the U.S. sample were recruited from campus and via an online student
sample pool and participants received extra course credit for their participation. In the
US, participants were seen in a small group setting. In Russia participants were recruited
on campus via in-class announcements. Participants completed all experimental materials
in one large group in a classroom setting. For all participants, demographic information
was collected from each participant regarding their gender, age, religion, ethnicity, and
education level. The demographic characteristics of both samples are summarized in
Table 1.
Exclusion criteria included expressing suspicion about the experimental
manipulation (assessed during debriefing by asking participants what they suspected the
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purpose of the study was, no subjects were eliminated due to suspicion), living abroad, or
failure to complete the entire questionnaire packet. If participants had lived abroad in
another country, then they were excluded. Participants who did not complete substantial
portions of the questionnaire packet, missed one or more measures, or did not complete
measures in their entirety, were excluded. Of the original sample, a total of 12
participants were excluded from the data. The descriptive data and statistical analyses
were based on the remaining 308 participants.
Measures
All measures that were used were provided in either English (for the American
sample) or Russian (for the Russian sample). The measures were translated from English
into Russian and then back-translated. Specifically, each measure was initially translated
from English into Russian by a native Russian-speaker. The Russian version was then
back-translated into English by an independent translator, who was English speaking and
who had not been previous exposed to the original measurement items. The translated
instruments were then checked for preservation of meaning and cultural appropriateness.
Back translation was used as an extra step to ensure the original meaning of each concept
was preserved (Brislin, 1980).
Level of Religiosity. This was used as a measure of participants degree of
engagement in religiosity. Items from for this measure have been taken from: Religious
Faith and Practice Questionnaire by Fernandez, Castano, and Singh (2010) which
consists of a simple 6-item questionnaire measuring level of religious faith and practices.
Each item is rated on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from Never (1) to Always (6). This
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measure has been used in both individualistic and collectivist cultures. In the current
study, the level of religiosity demonstrated good reliability (Chronbach’s α = .903).
The National Identification Measure (Roccas, Klar, Liviatan, 2006, Fernandez &
Castano, in press) is a 16 item measure of nationalism. It consists of two scales (8 items
each) measuring an individual’s identification (attachment and glorification) with their
nation. Participants indicated their agreement with each item on a 7-point Likert scale
ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. For the purposes of this study the two
subscale scores were not employed, rather the overall score which indicated degree of
nationalism was used. The one-factor scale was used in this study and was found to have
good internal reliability (Chronbach’s α = .866).
The Rosenberg Self Esteem Inventory (Rosenberg, 1965), is a 10-item self-report
measure which uses either a 4 or 5 point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to
strongly disagree. This measure is one of the most popular and widely used measures of
self-esteem and has been used in numerous terror management theory studies. Fleming
and Courtney (1984) reported a Chronbach’s alpha of .88 and test-retest correlation of
.85. Internal reliability in this study was .846.
The Horizontal and Vertical Individualism-Collectivism Scale (Singelis, Triandis,
Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995), is a scale used to assess respondents’ degree of collectivistic
or individualistic orientation. This measure consists of a 16-item, 7-point Likert scale
measuring the four dimensions of horizontal individualism, vertical individualism,
horizontal collectivism, vertical collectivism, and includes statements such as “I’d rather
depend on myself than others”, “It is important that I do my job better than others”, etc.
Individualistic and Collectivistic subscales are based on the sum totals of their
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corresponding items (8 items each). Additionally, total scores for each of the above four
dimensions can be calculated, but this was not done so here. In the current study, the onefactor scale (for which all 16 item responses were summed) was used which
demonstrated good reliability (Chronbach’s α = .801).
The Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988), on which participants report on how they felt at the moment during the mortality
salience induction. Following previous TMT research the PANAS is included as a filler
task and to allow a check for the presence of mood effects to determine if the mortality
salience manipulation produced positive and/or negative affect. The PANAS is a 20-item
self-report measure of affect states, on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Very Slightly
or Not at all to Extremely. Half of the items measure positive affect (PA) and the other
half measure negative affect (NA). The item responses for each subscale is summed,
yielding a composite score for each subscale. Watson et al. (1988) reported Chronbach’s
alpha coefficients ranging from .86 to .90 for the PA scale and .84 to .87 for the NA
scale, with test-retest correlations (over an 8 week period) ranged from .47 to .68 for PA,
.39 to .71 for NA. In the current study, internal reliability alpha coefficient scores for PA
was .832 and NA .839.
The Pro and Anti-National Essays
The pro-national and anti-national American essays were taken from previous TMT
research, and were provided by the author S. Solomon (personal communication, October
16, 2010). To create a pro-national Russian essay, a Russian student was invited to
submit two essays which represented “pro-Russian” and “anti-Russian” sentiment. These
essays were then reviewed by additional individuals who were native Russians or who
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were familiar with attitudes and beliefs of Russian culture. Essays are listed in the
Appendix.
Evaluation of Essays
The proxy for measuring worldview defense is the extent to which individuals
react positively or negatively to material or positions affirming or criticizing one’s
cultural identity. For this study, consistent with many other TMT studies, this was
operationalized as the evaluation of the essay writer. Specifically, participants were asked
to rate the extent to which a series of traits (positive and negative) applied to each author
of the essays. The critique of each essay’s author consisted of the same form used in
Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon (1990) study. The form consisted of 15 positive
and 15 negative personality characteristics and uses a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 1
= not at all to 9 = extremely. Finally, participants were also asked to indicate “Overall,
how positively or negatively do you feel about the author?” using a 9-point Likert scale
ranging from negatively (1) to positively (9). This score obtained indicated respondents
overall opinion of the author. The positive and negative personality traits were each
summed (after reverse scoring the negatively worded items) to create positive and
negative composite scores for each essay. This latter composite score was subtracted
from the positive composite score to create an overall composite variable reflecting the
positivity of respondent’s attitudes towards the essay authors. Thus, a positive overall
composite score indicated a favorable overall view of the author and a negative total
indicated a negative overall view of the author.
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Procedure
The procedures below were approved by the James Madison University
Institutional Review Board. Participants in each sample were students from universities
who mostly consisted of undergraduate students currently enrolled in one or more
psychology courses. Students were recruited from campus and/or from an online student
pool. US participants received extra course credit for their participation. Participants were
either seen in a small group setting (U.S.) in a large group classroom setting (Russia).
Informed consent was obtained prior to the start of the experimental session. After
consent was obtained, participants were informed that the experimental session consisted
of a series of allegedly unrelated studies administered together for the sake of
convenience. The MS manipulation or control was presented first, followed by delay
tasks, the worldview defense measure, followed bythe (actually there were more, we just
aren’t analyzing them, so our language needs to be framed accordingly) personality
questionnaires. The worldview defense assessment was administered in the middle of the
packet, which follows prior TMT studies (Tam, Chiu, & Lau, 2007). Participants were
asked to answer the questions in the order they are presented, and not go back to previous
pages or items (see Figure 1 for overview of procedure).
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Figure 1.
Overview of the Study Procedure
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Participants were first given a packet consisting of a survey entitled “Personality,
Attitudes, and Perceptions of Others.” The survey was composed of the 10- item
Rosenberg Self Esteem Inventory (Rosenberg, 1965), a Level of Religiosity measure, the
National Identification Measure, and demographic questions. Then, within each culture,
participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: i) Personal
Mortality Salience; ii) Collective Mortality Salience; iii) Control condition. The 3 packet
types were randomly distributed to participants. This resulted in 31.5% (n = 97) of
participants in the Personal Mortality Salience condition, 34.7% (n = 107) of participants
in the Collective Mortality Salience condition, and 33.8% (n = 100) of participants in the
Dental Pain control condition for the overall sample.
In the Personal Mortality Salience condition, participants were asked to complete
two open-ended questions: “Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your
own death arouses in you”, and “Jot down as specifically as you can, what you think will
happen to you as you physically die, and once you are physically dead.” In the Collective
Mortality Salience Condition, participants were asked to imagine that their country was
destroyed by a natural disaster resulting in obliteration of all the people in their country,
and then asked to respond to two questions: “What emotions does the thought of your
death and the death of all the people in your country arouse in you?”, and “What will
happen to you and the people in your country when your bodies die?”. In the control
condition, participants responded to two parallel questions in which the death-related
words were substituted with dental pain, consistent with prior research. Both the
personal mortality salience and control conditions have been successfully used in
numerous TMT research (e.g. Florian & Mikulincer, 1997; Greenberg, et al., 1990;
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Greenberg, et al., 1992). The collective mortality salience condition was derived from
Kashima et al., 2004.
Immediately following the mortality salience manipulation, participants
completed the Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988), on which they report on how they felt at the moment. Following previous TMT
research, the PANAS was included to determine if the mortality salience manipulation
produced positive and/or negative affect and also served as a filler task. This filler task
was included as a distraction task because prior research has shown that mortality
salience effects on worldview defense are more robust following a brief delay
(Greenburg, Pyszcznski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994).
Next, the Horizontal and Vertical Individualism-Collectivism Scale (Singelis,
Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995), a scale assessing collectivism and individualism
was administered to assess the degree of collectivistic or individualistic orientation.
Next, participants were asked to read two essays, which were introduced as the
second unrelated study designed to explore intercultural perceptions by investigating
students’ evaluations of essays written by foreign exchange/visiting students. One essay
was an anti-nationalistic essay designed to threaten participants’ cultural worldviews
(anti-American or anti-Russian essay for each respective country). The other essay was
similar in length but was a pro-nationalistic essay. The order of presentation of the essays
was counterbalanced.
Each essay was then followed the evaluation of the essay writer, which served as
the proxy for worldview defense. Specifically, participants were asked to complete an
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evaluation of each essay’s author in which they rate the extent to which a series of traits
(positive and negative) applied to each author of the essays. The author evaluation
consisted of the same form used in the Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon (1990)
study. The form consists of 15 positive and 15 negative personality characteristics and
uses a 9-point Likert scale ranging from not at all to extremely. Finally, participants were
also asked to indicate “Overall, how positively or negatively do you feel about the
author?” using a 9-point Likert scale ranging from negatively (1) to positively (9).
Following this, participants were administered two other personality measures
that were not included in the analyses of this study so they are not described here.
After each of the participants completed the experiment, they were thanked for
their participation, probed for suspicion, asked about their experience living in another
culture, then fully de-briefed and dismissed after their participation. Participants were
also provided with the experimenter’s contact information if they desired to follow up or
if they would like to be made aware of the results of the experiment in the future.

CHAPTER IV: RESULTS
This section presents the results of the data analyses and consists of three parts.
First, descriptive analyses of the data are presented, including descriptive statistics
regarding study participants and various measures. Specifically, comparisons between the
Russian and American samples are explored. Second, results are presented for the main
analyses testing the four hypotheses of the study, using analysis of co-variance in the
experimental design for each of the four dependent variables (author evaluations) of
worldview defense.
Descriptive Analyses
Descriptive statistics were conducted for demographic variables and all study
measures and are presented in Table 1 and Table 2. In Table 1 means, standard
deviations, and frequency distributions of the characteristics of the participants in the
study, are shown by country (America and Russa). Preliminary analyses were conducted,
specifically t-tests were used to compare the treatment and control groups on the
demographic variables to test for a priori differences between the groups that may
influence the primary analyses. Correlations of the demographic variables and other
study variables were computed.
Significant differences between groups between the U.S. and Russia samples,
revealed group differences in age, college year, self-esteem, and nationalism. The U.S.
had more males to females (U.S.: males 40%, females 59%; Russia males 22%, females
78%) t(306) = -3.52, p < .05, was higher in self-esteem and nationalism compared to
Russia (see Table 1 for descriptives and group differences). The U.S. sample also tended
to have higher ratings of positive and negative affect, compared to the Russian sample.
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However, the Russian sample was older and had a higher academic level than the
U.S. Within each country, for the U.S., Collective Mortality Salience Group ((M = 32.38)
and the Dental Pain Group ((M = 34.13) significantly differed in self-esteem t(116) = 2.06, p < .05. For Russia all three groups, Personal Mortality Salience group (M = 2.21),
Collective Mortality Salience Group ((M = 3.40), Dental Pain Group ((M = 2.95)
significantly differed in education level. In the Russian sample, Personal Mortality
Salience group (M = 19.18), and the Dental Pain Group (M = 20.02) differed
significantly in age t( 84) = -3.16, p < .05.

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for All Measures by Country, with T-tests for
Group Differences

Variable
Age
Academic Level
Self Esteem
Nationalism
PANAS Positive
PANAS Negative
Collectivism
Individualism
Coll/IndivComposite

U.S.
Mean
SD
19.1
1.5
33.1
47.4
34.8
24.6
96.8
93.3
-3.5

2.7
.7
4.5
9.3
6.8
7.6
14.5
14.9
19.6

Russia
Mean
SD
19.7
2.8
29.6
42.8
29.6
22.6
99.5
96.2
-3.2

1.2
1.0
4.0
12.6
6.4
7.9
16.7
15.6
20.1

t
-2.2*
-11.9*
7.0*
3.6*
6.8*
2.2*
-1.5
-1.6
-.1

* p > .05
Note: t values are based on equal variances and 2-tailed significance

39
For the overall sample, Table 2 represents the descriptive data for all study
measures for overall sample, and by each condition (personal mortality salience,
collective mortality salience, and control). Preliminary analyses were conducted,
specifically t-tests were used to compare the treatment and control groups on the
demographic variables to test for a priori differences between the groups that may
influence the primary analyses. For the overall sample, significant differences between
groups (personal mortality salience, collective mortality salience, and control). Revealed
group differences in age, gender, college year, self-esteem, and nationalism (see Table 2
for descriptive data). The Personal Mortality Salience Group and Collective Mortality
Salience Group differed significantly differed in gender t(202) = 1.699, p < .01, college
year t(201) = -3.445, p < .01, and PANAS Negative score t(202) = -1.48, p < .03.
Participants in the Personal Mortality Salience Group were generally male, with higher
academic level, and with more negative affect (as measured by the PANAS) compared to
participants in the Collective Mortality Salience Group. The Personal Mortality Salience
Group and the Dental Pain Group did not differ significantly on any of the variables.
Collective Mortality Salience Group and the Dental Pain Group differed in in gender
t(209) = -1.891, p < .01 and collectivism t(209) = -2.866, p = .05. The Control Group was
composed of more females and less males, with participants holding greater collectivistic
orientation compared to participants in the Collective Mortality Salience Group.
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Table 2.
Means and Standard Deviations for All Measures for Overall Sample by Condition:
Personal Mortality Salience, Collective Mortality Salience, and Control
Variable

Mean (SD)
Personal MS

Mean (SD)
Collective MS

Mean (SD)
Control

N
Gender
Male
Female
Age
Academic Level
Self Esteem
Nationalism
PANAS Positive
PANAS Negative
Collectivism
Individualism
Ind/Coll

97

31.5%

107

34.7%

104

33.8%

28
69
19.0
1.8
31.6
44.7
32.6
23.1
93.3
95.6
-1.7

28.9%
71.1%
(1.1)
(.9)
(4.6)
(11.2)
(6.9)
(6.9)
(13.8)
(15.2)
(20.4)

43
64
19.5
2.3
31.1
44.5
32.6
24.6
94.8
96.1
-2.1

40.2%
59.8%
(1.8)
(1.2)
(4.3)
(10.8)
(7.3)
(7.9)
(16.0)
(16.6)
(21.7)

29
75
19.7
2.1
32.1
47.0
32.3
23.3
101.9
102.1
-6.2

27.9%
72.1%
(3.04)
(1.1)
(5.03)
(11.2)
(7.2)
(8.3)
(12.0)
(13.9)
(16.9)

Note: Ind/Coll = Individualism/Collectivism Composite
Main Analyses
The primary dependent variable was the evaluation of the essay authors, which in
this study serves as a proxy for worldview defense. As noted in the procedure section,
each participant rated a pro- and anti-national essay on 30 attributes (15 positive and 15
negative) and provided an overall evaluation on a 1 to 9 scale. The positive and negative
traits were each summed (after reverse scoring the negatively worded items) to create
positive and negative composite scores for each essay. The primary index that the current
study is exploring is the extent to which individuals identify more positively with proand more negatively with anti-national sentiments following a mortality salience
induction.

41
To test the primary hypotheses of the study, separate 3 (personal mortality
salience, collective mortality salience, control) X 2 (country) analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) were performed on the dependent variables (author rating variables). The
dependent variables consisted of the scores on the evaluations of the authors, specifically
the composite scores of the positive and negative attributes (summed positive traits –
composite score, summed negative traits –composite score, etc.), the overall composite
score (difference of these composite scores), and the single overall author score, as
worldview defense variables, (See Tables 3 and 4). Tables 3 and 4 summarize the means
and standard deviations for each of these worldview defense scores for the American and
Russian samples, respectively. Thus, the worldview defense evaluation consisted of 3
items that assessed the participants’ evaluation of the authors (the extent to which they
attributed positive and negative personality traits to each author) and one item that
assessed the evaluation of the essays (the extent to which participants agreed with the
author’s opinion). This latter evaluation was made on a 9-point Likert scale (1= not at all,
9 = totally). The evaluations of each author served as the measures of favorability toward
worldview-consistent and worldview-inconsistent others, respectively. Tables 3 and 4
represents a summary of the worldview defense scores presented by country.

42
Table 3.
Means and Standard Deviations for Worldview Defense Measures for the American
Sample by Condition: Personal Mortality Salience, Collective Mortality Salience, and
Control
Variable

Personal MS
N = 53
Mean (SD)

Collective MS
N = 59
Mean (SD)

Control Control
N = 60
Mean (SD)

ProNationalistic Essay
Positive Composite
Negative Composite
Overall Composite
Overall Author score

65.0
62.1
2.8
6.4

10.6
19.4
26.3
1.3

64.1
66.2
-2.0
6.0

13.5
18.8
27.0
1.9

66.5
57.0
9.5
6.2

14.7
18.7
28.6
1.7

AntiNationalistic
Essay
Positive Composite
Negative Composite
Overall Composite
Overall Author score

56.1
82.6
-26.4
3.6

15.6
18.9
30.1
1.7

58.2
81.5
-23.2
4.1

16.2
16.6
26.8
1.7

52.4
81.7
-29.3
3.7

16.5
21.3
32.4
1.7

2.8
-26.4

26.3
30.1

-2.0
-23.2

27.0
26.8

9.5
-29.3

28.6
32.4

Combined(Pro-Anti)
Positive Composite
Negative Composite
Overall
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Table 4.
Means and Standard Deviations for Worldview Defense Measures for the Russian
Sample by Condition: Personal Mortality Salience, Collective Mortality Salience, and
Control
Variable

Personal MS
N = 44
Mean (SD)

Collective MS
N = 48
Mean (SD)

Control Control
N = 44
Mean (SD)

ProNationalistic Essay
Positive Composite
Negative Composite
Overall Composite
Overall Author

67.0
36.9
30.0
6.6

14.1
17.9
27.4
1.9

67.4
43.0
24.3
6.5

11.6
16.3
22.9
1.7

67.4
45.2
22.2
6.5

11.6
14.6
21.0
1.9

AntiNationalistic
Essay
Positive Composite
Negative Composite
Overall Composite
Overall Author

59.7
66.2
-6.5
4.1

18.8
23.3
35.7
2.0

70.1
67.2
2.9
4.8

17.6
20.2
31.5
2.2

70.1
67.3
2.8
4.8

18.6
22.0
34.1
1.8

Combined(Pro-Anti)
Positive Composite
Negative Composite

30.0
-6.5

27.4
35.7

24.3
2.9

22.9
31.5

22.2
2.8

21.0
34.1

Pro-National and Anti-National Essays: Author Evaluations. The first 2 X 3
ANOVA was conducted on the composite positive score of the pro-nationalistic author.
The second 2 X 3 ANOVA was conducted on the composite negative score of the pronationalistic author. The third ANOVA was performed on the overall composite score of
the for the pro-nationalistic author. The fourth ANOVA was performed on the overall
rating of the author’s opinion (based on the single item overall author rating) for the pronationalistic author. The fifth 2 X 3 ANOVA was conducted on the composite positive
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score of the anti-nationalistic author. The sixth 2 X 3 ANOVA was conducted on the
composite negative score of the anti-nationalistic author. The seventh 2 X 3 ANOVA was
conducted on the overall composite score (sum total of the difference between the
negative and positive personality characteristics), for the anti-nationalistic author. The
eighth 2 X 3 ANOVA was conducted on the overall rating of the author’s opinion (based
on the single item overall author rating) for the anti-nationalistic author. Any significant
interaction effects were followed by an analysis of simple main effects.
Pro-nationalistic Essay. The first ANOVA was performed on the composite
positive score of the pro-nationalistic author, which was used as the dependent variable.
The first hypothesis, that participants in the mortality salience condition, would have
higher positive evaluation scores for the pro-nationalistic author than participants in the
dental pain control condition was tested by the main effect of treatment in the ANOVA.
Results indicate no main effect of treatment condition, country, nor country x condition
interaction F(2,302) = .253, p = .777, η2 = .002, F(1,302) = 1.955, p = .163, η2 = .006,
F(2,302) = .228, p = .796, η2 = .002, respectively. Thus, the hypothesis was not
supported.
The second 2 X 3 ANOVA was conducted on the composite negative score of the
pro-nationalistic author. Results indicate significant main effects of country and condition
X country interaction, F(1,302) = 94.977, p < .01, η2 = .239 and F(2,302) = 4.080, p =
.01, η2 = .018, respectively. There was no main effect of condition overall F(2,302) =
2.145, p = .119, η2 = .014. Further examination of results revealed in both the U.S. and
Russia, significant main effects of condition on this worldview defense measure,
F(2,169) = 3.484, p = .03, η2 = .040, F(2,133) = 3.016, p = .05, η2 = .043, respectively. In

45
the U.S. participants in the CMS condition endorsed more negative traits for the pronationalistic author than participants in the Control condition (p < .01) In Russia,
participants in the Control condition endorsed more negative traits for the pronationalistic author than participants in the PMS condition (p=.02), or in the CMS
condition (moderate effect, p = .07). Thus, for Russian participants, those in the PMS
responded with least negative evaluation (more favorable) of the pro-nationalistic author,
followed by CMS, and participants in the Control condition rated pro-nationalistic author
most negatively.
American participants viewed the pro-nationalistic author less favorably (higher
negative traits scores) than Russian participants, across all conditions, with the greatest
difference between PMS and CMS conditions. In the U.S., CMS viewed the pronationalistic most negatively, followed by PMS, and then Controls. These results do not
support the hypothesis that participants in PMS would view worldview similar others
more favorably compared to Controls.
The third ANOVA was performed on the overall composite score for the pronationalistic author. Higher scores indicated more favorable evaluation of the pronationalistic author. Results indicate significant main effect of country F(1,302) =
55.073, p < .01, η2 = .154 and marginal main effect of condition X country interaction,
and F(2,302) = 2.501, p = .08, η2 = .016. There was no main effect of condition overall
F(2,302) = 1.290, p = .277, η2 = .008. Russian participants in all three conditions scored
higher (endorsed more favorable evaluations of the pro-nationalistic author) than
American participants, regardless of condition. Further examination revealed a marginal
main effect for condition in the U.S. sample (F(2,169) = 2.687, p = .07, η2 = .031.
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Controls responded with more favorable ratings of the pro-nationalistic author than
participants exposed to Collective Mortality Salience induction. (p=.02). When effects of
moderating variables, self-esteem, nationalism, individualism/collectivism, and
collectivism were removed, post-hoc comparisons revealed Russian participants viewed
the pro-nationalistic author more favorably (PMS > CMS > Controls), (higher overall
composite scores) than American participants, across all conditions with the greatest
difference between PMS (Russia (M = 32.34, U.S. M = 1.817) and CMS (Russia M =
26.84, U.S. M = -2.83) conditions. In the U.S., Controls viewed the pro-nationalistic
author most favorably, followed by PMS, and CMS viewed this author negatively. These
results do not support the hypothesis, in fact this finding is in the directly opposite to our
prediction. Also, participants in the Control condition had higher self-esteem than those
in the Collective Mortality Salience condition. Due to higher self-esteem these
participants should have resulted in less worldview defense for Controls, but this did not
occur. However, results from the Russian sample do provide support the hypothesis that
when individuals are reminded of their mortality (PMS and CMS) they will engage in
worldview defense and view a pro-nationalistic author more favorably compared to
Controls.
The fourth ANOVA was performed on the overall rating of the author’s opinion
(based on the single item overall author rating) for the pro-nationalistic author. This was
based on the single overall score of the author provided by the respondent. Results
revealed no main effects for condition, country, nor a condition X country interaction.
Anti-nationalistic Essay. The fifth 2 X 3 ANOVA was conducted on the
composite positive score of the anti-nationalistic author. Results indicate significant
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main effects of condition, country, and condition X country interaction, F(2,302) =3.326,
p = .03, η2 = .022, F(1,302) = 31.368, p <.01, η2 = .094, and F(2,302) = 4.191, p = .01, η2
= .027, respectively. Pairwise comparisons revealed significant differences between PMS
and CMS, p = .01, with the CMS rating the anti-nationalistic author higher on positive
traits. Between countries, main differences occurred between CMS and Control, with
Russian participants endorsing more favorable ratings for the anti-nationalistic author
compared to American participants, across all conditions, but most significantly in the
CMS and Control conditions. Further examination of results revealed in Russia,
significant main effect of condition on this worldview defense measure, F(2,133) =
4.767, p = .01, η2 = .067, but not for both the U.S. F(2,169) = 1.952, p = .145, η2 = .023.
In Russia, participants in the CMS (p <.01) and Control (p<.01) conditions viewed the
anti-nationalistic author more favorably (higher positive trait composite score) compared
to the PMS condition.
The sixth 2 X 3 ANOVA was conducted on the composite negative score of the
anti-nationalistic author. Results indicate a significant main effect of country F(1, 302) =
41.295, p <.01, η2 = .120. No main effect were found for treatment condition, nor country
x condition interaction F(2,302) = .001, p = .999, η2 <.001, F(2,302) = .083, p = .921, η2
= .001, respectively. When effects of the nationalism were removed, participants in the
U.S. sample rated the anti-nationalistic author more negatively overall, compared to
participants in the Russian sample, across all conditions regardless of condition (PMS
U.S. M = 82.26, Russia M = 67.14; CMS U.S. M = 81.25, Russia M = 68.19; Control
U.S. M = 80.77, Russia M = 67.61). Follow up analyses revealed no significant
differences in either the U.S. nor Russia, on this worldview defense measure.
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The seventh 2 X 3 ANOVA was conducted on the overall composite score (sum
total of the difference between the negative and positive personality characteristics), for
the anti-nationalistic author. Results indicate significant main effect of country F(1,302)
= 51.373, p <.01, η2 = .145 . There was no main effect of condition nor condition X
country interaction F(2,302) = 1.003, p = .368, η2 = .007 , F(2,302) = .914, p = .402, η2 =
.006, respectively. When effects of nationalism were removed, post-hoc comparisons
revealed American participants rated the anti-nationalistic author more negatively (higher
negative trait composite scores) than Russian participants, across all conditions (PMS
U.S. M = -25.97, Russia M = -7.64; CMS U.S. M = -22.88, Russia M = 1.71; Control
U.S. M = -28.04, Russia M = 2.43).
The eighth 2 X 3 ANOVA was conducted on the overall rating of the author’s
opinion (based on the single item overall author rating) for the anti-nationalistic author.
Results revealed no main effects for condition, country, nor condition X country
interaction.
Analysis of Moderating Variables
Additional analysis were performed to explore the effects of the covariates. Possible
covariates included level of nationalism, religiosity, age, and self-esteem. To determine
whether self-esteem, religiosity, individualism, collectivism or nationalism served as
moderating variables which may have influenced the results, the above analyses were
repeated with self-esteem, religiosity, individualism, collectivism or nationalism as
covariates. Only results that significantly differed are reported below.

49
The results of the ANCOVAs conducted on the composite positive score of the
pro-nationalistic author, revealed self-esteem (p = .03), and nationalism (p <.01),
significantly predicted this dependent variable, and accounted for 1.6% and 4.9% of the
variance in participants ratings of positive traits for the pro-nationalistic author.
The results of the ANCOVAs performed on the composite negative score of the
pro-nationalistic author, results showed self-esteem (p = .028), and nationalism (p <.01),
and individualism/collectivism (p <.01), as moderators for this dependent variable. These
covariates accounted for 1.6%, 8.3%, and 5.8% of the variance, respectively, in
participants ratings of negative traits for the pro-nationalistic author. When the effects of
these moderating variables were removed, the significant main effects of country (ps
<.01) and country X condition interaction (p = .014 to .031) remained.
For the overall composite score of the for the pro-nationalistic author, ANCOVAs
indicated self-esteem (p = .022), and nationalism (p <.01), individualism/collectivism (p
<.01), and collectivism (p <.01), significantly predicted participant overall trait
evaluations. These covariates accounted for 2.2%, 9.5% , 3.5%, and 8.3% of the
variance, respectively. When moderating effects of these variables were removed, the
significant main effects of country (ps <.01) remained. The moderate main effect of
country X condition interaction (p = .0 70 to .083) remained when the effects of
nationalism and individualism/ collectivism were removed, however, but not for selfesteem (p = .141) nor collectivism (p = .121).
Results of the ANCOVAs performed on the composite negative score of the antinationalistic author, results showed nationalism (p <.01), as a moderator for this
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dependent variable, which accounted for 2.2% of the variance. When moderating effects
of this variable was removed, the significant main effects of country (p <.01) remained.
For the overall composite score of the for the anti-nationalistic author, ANCOVAs
indicated nationalism (p = .033), significantly predicted participant overall trait
evaluations. Nationalism accounted for 1.5% of the variance. When moderating effects
of this variable was removed, the significant main effect of country (p <.01) remained.

CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION
TMT proposes that humans engage in a unique defensive reaction to manage the
existential anxiety when reminded of their inevitable mortality. When aroused by deathrelated thoughts, a dual-component process of defense is activated which results in first
proximal then distal defensive reactions. Specifically, individuals will conform more
closely to the norms of their culture, defend their cultural worldview, and derogate others
that threaten or challenge their cultural worldview (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyscycnski,
1997). A plethora of empirical research has found that in a typical mortality salience
paradigm, when individuals are prompted to think about their mortality, they
subsequently engage in efforts to defend their cultural worldviews which are
hypothesized to provide a sense of self-worth and enduring mortality (symbolic
mortality) (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1989; Greenberg et al., 1990).
Regarding the prediction that mortality salience would increase worldview
defense, compared to a control condition, in both the United States and Russian samples.,
no significant differences were found. Individuals were expected to experience more
worldview defense in the mortality salient condition than in a control condition (dental
pain). The results of this study did not consistently support this prediction. Descriptively,
the U.S. participants who were not reminded of their own mortality viewed the pronationalistic author most favorably, followed by participants in the Personal Mortality
Salience condition, and those in the Collective Mortality Salience condition viewed this
author negatively. Thus, results from the American sample stand in opposition to what
was predicted. However, results from the Russian sample did provide some support for
the hypothesis that when individuals are reminded of their mortality (PMS and CMS
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conditions) they engaged in worldview defense and viewed a pro-nationalistic author
more favorably compared to Controls. For the composite score of negative trait ratings
for the pro-nationalistic author, Russian participants, in the PMS condition responded
with least negative evaluation (more favorable) of the pro-nationalistic author, followed
by CMS condition, and participants in the Control condition rated pro-nationalistic author
most negatively.
Additionally, there was a trend that Russian participants tended to viewed the
pro-nationalistic author more favorably than American participants, across all conditions.
This is an interesting finding because the American sample was higher in nationalism
than the Russian sample. Another interesting finding was that participants in the
American sample, exhibited a tendency to rate the anti-nationalistic author more
negatively than participants in the Russian sample, regardless of condition (and after
nationality was included as a covariate). Affect may have also been a factor in that
American participants endorsed higher positive and higher negative affect than Russian
participants. Emotional regulation issues may have influence participants responses
overall, but did not vary by condition.
The second prediction is that there would be a differential effect of collective
mortality salience and individual mortality salience for individuals from different
backgrounds. That is, for individuals from a collectivist worldview (Russia), where the
collective self may have more importance than the individual self, the Collective
mortality salience was predicted to have a greater impact than Personal mortality salience
on worldview defense, but that the reverse of this would hold for individuals from a
culture with an individualistic orientation, as in America. This hypothesis was not
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supported. Russian participants viewed the pro-nationalistic author more favorably in the
Personal mortality salience condition then the Collective mortality salience condition and
then Controls. One explanation could be that participants did not fully experience
collective death anxiety or that the method for this induction was not authentic enough to
activate such anxiety. Results had mixed effects for individualism/collectivism
orientation as a moderating variable, but a collectivistic orientation contributed to more
positive overall composite evaluations of the pro-nationalistic author.
Consistent with the anxiety-buffer theory of self-esteem, a third hypothesis that
higher self-esteem should reduce the need to engage in worldview defense, whereas
individuals with low self-esteem would engage in greater worldview defense, was not
consistently supported.
Finally, it was hypothesized that high religious fundamentalism should reduce the
need to engage in worldview defense, whereas low fundamentalism would engage in
more worldview defense in the mortality salience condition than in the control condition.
Evaluations of this hypothesis found no differences between groups in Russia nor the US,
nor for overall sample, thus the prediction was not supported. This could be partly due to
the fact that our variable was reduced to one item that asked participants if they
considered themselves to be highly religious. Thus, the lack of support for this hypothesis
may be due to methodological issues.
The exploratory nature of this study highlighted some interesting findings. The
comparison between Russian and American samples, within TMT, and with the addition
of collectivistic versus individualistic orientations extends the literature and theory. One
observation was that American participants rated both the pro-nationalistic author and the
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anti-nationalistic author more negatively (overall composite scores) than Russian
participants, across all conditions. Even when effects of moderating variables were
removed (e.g. nationalism and self-esteem), were removed. This may be related to U.S.
participants’ affect, in that a priori group differenced indicated American participants
endorsed more extreme mood scores, as measured by the PANAS, and their higher scores
on negative affect may have influenced these results. Why did U.S. students endorse
more extreme mood states compared to Russian students? Does this indicate U.S.
students have less emotional regulation than Russian students or is this difference more a
reflection of display rules?
Another interesting finding was that there were no significant differences between
the Russian and U.S. samples for collectivism or individualism. This could be a
developmental issue, in that participants were young adults who may have greater focus
on self rather than group and community values and goals. Lack of differences between
the two samples, could be due to the measure used to assess these constructs. However,
past studies have found that Russia is a collectivistic culture using same and similar
measures (Allik & Realo, 2004; Hoftsede, 1983; Kuhnen, Hannover, Roeder, et al., 2001;
Smith, Trompenaars, & Dugan, 1995; Tower, Kelly, & Richards, 1997). Although
research has posited that value patterns are relatively enduring across cultures (Inglehart
& Baker, 2000), Russia is developing a more capitalistic economy which stresses
individualism, independence, and competitiveness, thus young Russian students may
increasingly be identified with and less collectivistic. In the present study, only young
students were used. Older Russian generation might very well be identified with a more
collectivistic society. A recent investigation of cultural typologies related to collectivism
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and individualism, placed Russia closer to the individualistic dimension when selfreliance and competitiveness were factors (Green, Deschamps, & Paez, 2005).
Additionally, collectivism and individualism are broad concepts that have been
operationalized and measured in numerous ways. Although the current measures have
been used cross-culturally and are considered valid measures of these constructs, it is
likely that the current measures may not assess relevant characteristics of the constructs
and differences between and/or commonalties among both countries (Allik & Realo,
2004).
Age differences between Russian and American samples, could be considered an
important variable regarding group differences. Russia sample was significantly older
than the American sample, although in the American sample, age varied more. However,
this argument does not seem plausible. Both samples were near 19 years of age. TMT
research has shown an elevation in death anxiety for individuals in their 20s. Perhaps
participants in the Russian sample were beginning to experience this increase, which
would explain the results found that Russian participants rated the pro-nationalistic
author more favorably (worldview bolstering behavior), compared to American’s.
However, following this age-related argument, participants in the PMS and CMS should
have engaged in significantly more worldview defense compared to the control condition.
But this did not occur in the current study.
Other possible differences between Russian and U.S. samples, and within groups,
may have been personal need for structure, which may have influenced the results.
Perhaps, Russian participants have a greater personal need for structure, which may
account for increased worldview bolstering behavior among Russian participants overall,
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compared to the American participants, although this was not consistent with antinationalistic author evaluations. Personal need for structure has been found to increase
worldview defense (Juhl & Clay, 2010).
Another exploratory aspect of the current study was the inclusion of a Collective
Mortality Salience condition. The induction used in this study was adapted from Kashima
et al. 2004, but altered slightly to replace annihilation due to meteorite with annihilation
due to a natural disaster, due to it being more plausible for the cultures investigated in
this study. The findings did not support our predictions regarding differences in
worldview defense between Personal (traditional) Mortality Salience condition and
Collective Mortality Salience condition Collectivistic and Individualistic cultures. This
lack of support for this prediction may be due to lack of differences in Collectivism and
Individualism between our samples. Lack of findings may also be due to limited testing
of this novel induction.
The mortality salience hypothesis has been validated in numerous published
studies in which death-related thoughts have led to either more positive or negative
evaluations of others, depending whether they promoted or criticized/challenged the
cultural worldview. The results of this study did not replicate these findings. Mortality
salience induction did not consistently evoke a more positive evaluation of pronationalistic essay authors and/or a more negative evaluation of anti-nationalistic essay
authors who criticized cultural worldviews. Participants in the mortality salience
condition (both personal mortality salience and collective mortality salience) did not
reliably engage in greater defensive processes compared to the control condition. The
results of the current study failed to replicate mortality salience effects, which has been
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robust finding in TMT research. The following discussion attempts to account for the
current results, considers limitations of the study, examines the universality of TMT, and
proposes future directions of TMT research.
The lack of significant differences in pro-nationalistic and anti-nationalistic essay
author ratings between mortality salience and control conditions may be due in part to the
delay time to induce defensive processes, specifically worldview defense. A recent metaanalysis of TMT research found that differences in delay between mortality salience
induction and the dependent measure resulted in mortality salience effect sizes. Burke,
Martens, & Faucher (2010) found that studies with three-task delays (e.g. mood checklist
plus word search puzzle plus innocuous filler survey) or two-task delays produced
significantly larger effects compared to those with a single delay task or no delay. In
addition to number of tasks, delay was also examined by estimates of length of time.
Experiments with longer delays (7-20 minutes) produced significantly larger effects than
experiments with shorter (2-6 minute) delays or no delays (Burke, Martens, & Faucher
(2010). Based on these findings, it is possible that the current study did not provide
either a sufficient length of time for delay or number of delay tasks to allow for deathrelated thoughts to recede from conscious awareness. TMT and research indicates that
there is a time course of mortality salience effects and that unconscious effects (distal
defensive processes) occur more strongly when thoughts of death are outside of
consciousness but accessible.
Another explanation of the present results is that the death related thoughts were
not sufficiently outside of participants’ awareness to induce worldview defensive
reactions among participants. TMT posits that death-thoughts are a necessary link

58
between mortality salience manipulations and worldview defense. Research supports this
notion. Greenburg and colleagues (1994) showed that after the standard mortality
salience induction, worldview defense occurs and death-related thoughts are evoked.
Furthermore, in a study conducted by Arndt and colleagues, (Arndt, Greenburg,
Psyzczynski, et al., 1997), subliminal priming using words “dead” and “pain” resulted in
higher accessibility of death-related thoughts and greater worldview defense when
compared with priming using the words “field” and “pain”. These researchers found in a
follow-up study, when participants are aware of the word “death” being flashed, mortality
salience effects do not immediately occur. Thus, awareness of death-related thoughts did
not produce mortality salience effects. TMT theorists posit that this occurs because death
related thoughts need to be outside of awareness in order for the worldview defense
mechanism to be employed. This is because immediately after people concentrate on
thoughts of death (i.e. the death-thoughts are in conscious awareness), proximal defenses
are employed, such as suppression or denial of vulnerability, to remove death-thoughts
from awareness. Arndt and colleagues (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszcznski, &
Simon, 1997) investigated whether the removal of death-thoughts from conscious
awareness is necessary for later worldview defense. They had participants think about
their own mortality using the standard mortality salience induction and tested their
accessibility to death related thoughts under cognitive loads during different time points.
Participants were asked to remember an 11 number sequence (presented for 30 seconds),
then presented with “filler items” which consisted of either mortality salience or control
items, affect questionnaire, an initial world completion task measuring death-thought
accessibility, distraction task (reading a passage), second word completion task
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measuring death-thought accessibility. Manipulation involved high and low cognitive
load tasks differing in interference tasks. Low cognitive load consisted of jotting down
the number sequence immediately after the mortality salience induction. High cognitive
load consisted of jotting down the number sequence either after the initial death-thought
accessibility measure (and longer delay) or after the second death-thought accessibility
measure (even longer delay). They hypothesize that high cognitive load disrupts
participants’ ability to suppress death-thoughts was supported in the finding that an
immediate increase in death-related thought and worldview defense in both high
cognitive load conditions.
One explanation for the failure to find consistently significant differences between
worldview defense in the mortality salient condition compared to control condition, is
that the cognitive load required in the delay tasks were not appropriate to produce
mortality salience effects and that death-related thoughts were not sufficiently outside of
participants’ awareness to induce worldview defensive reactions among participants. The
current study did not include a manipulation check to determine whether death-thoughts
were actually evoked preceding the mortality salience induction. Although this is not a
standard procedure in the literature, it would be helpful in future research, particularly
when using a recently developed condition (collective mortality salience induction).
Cultural mindsets that have been imbued with death-related themes may
desensitize reactions to death-primes. This may be true of Russian culture in general and
more recently post-9/11 American culture. However, post 9/11 TMT research has found
mortality salience effects with American samples, which reduces the plausibility of this
argument. However, the timing and world events during which the current data was
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collected may have influenced the findings. During a substantial part of data collection,
the “Arab Spring” occurred. It is possible that this international event imbued the
international psyche with images and thoughts of death. Additionally, an integral aspect
to the ‘Arab Spring’ movement was challenging worldviews, beliefs and values of the
dominant government regimes. Thus, tolerance for or even bias towards challenging and
criticizing the main worldviews of specific nations was evident during this time and may
partly account for reduction in negative evaluations of others who challenge or oppose
nationalistic views in the current study.
Another possible factor that may explain the current results may be mode of
thinking. Simon and colleagues (1997) found that mortality salience was less likely to
produce worldview defense when participants were in a rational mode of thinking
(compared to experiential mode of thinking). They found that participants in the
experiential mode of thinking had more accessibility to death-related thoughts than did
those participants in the rational thinking mode. It is possible that participants in the
current study preferentially tended to employ a rational mode of thinking during the
experiment or that experimental conditions induced a more rational thinking mode which
resulted in less employment of defensive processes. The request to use language and
write down one’s thoughts about death may activate a more rational thinking mode,
whereas a request to draw or visualize and contemplate one’s death, may engage a more
experiential response. This may be an area for alternative methods of MS induction in
future research.
Individual psychosocial and personality characteristics may have influenced
death-related anxiety and defensive reactions to mortality salience. For instance, self-
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control has been shown to be a key mechanism for managing distressing thoughts and
feelings about mortality (Gailliot and colleagues 2006 cited in Niesta, Fritsche, & Jonas,
2008). Studies have found that after being primed with death, participants high in selfcontrol produced fewer death-related thoughts and reported less death anxiety than low
self-control participants, were less likely to perceive death-related themes and exhibited
less worldview defense. Moderating variables in this study that were found to influence
worldview defense measures were self-esteem, nationalism, individualism/collectivism,
and collectivism. Self-esteem appeared to moderate the positive composite trait score,
negative composite trait score, and overall composite evaluation for the pro-nationalistic
author, such that individuals with higher self-esteem rated the pro-nationalistic author
more favorably. However, this finding is in opposition to TMT hypothesis of self-esteem
as an anxiety buffer which predicts that individuals in low self-esteem engage in greater
worldview defense (such as rating an worldview similar other more favorably).
Nationalism moderated several worldview defense scores: the positive composite trait
score, negative composite trait score, and overall composite evaluation for the pronationalistic author, as well as the negative composite trait score, and overall composite
evaluation for the anti-nationalistic author. Individuals with higher nationalism rated the
pro-nationalistic author more favorably, responded with greater negative evaluations of
the anti-nationalistic author.
Limitations of the Study
One main limitation of the current study mentioned above, is procedural. It is
possible the delay task was not long enough to allow for sufficient time to produce
worldview defensive process. Along this line, although delay tasks did serve as
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distraction, perhaps they did not serve enough distraction to allow death related thoughts
to recede from conscious awareness. A distraction task (puzzle completion, etc.) was not
included, which may have more easily facilitated this process and produced different
results. TMT research has provided some evidence that greater death thought
accessibility occurs when the thoughts of death are removed from conscious awareness
via a distraction task (Greenberg et al., 1994, for review see Burke, Martens, & Faucher,
2010).
Another limitation of the study is that for one of the measures of worldview
defense, was only partly used, one question pertaining directly to the essay author. Other
TMT studies have used several evaluative questions (3-5 questions) regarding the essay
author as a measure worldview defense. Methodological issues are also relevant here. In
Russia, the study was conducted in large classroom contexts, whereas in the U.S.
participants were run in small groups. This may have produced differential responses
between the two samples. Additionally, the stimulus value of the essays and/or inductions
in PMS, CMS, and Control may not have been strong enough to produce internal
reactions in these samples. This may be due to a host of pre-morbid individual
characteristics, such as depression, tolerance to uncertainty, political orientation, etc., that
may have contributed to responses biases. In terms of methodology, it was observed by
that participants varied in length and content of their responses. Formal examination of
participants’ written responses to the MS inductions would have been an important factor
to the current methodology to assess for quantity and quality of death-related content (or
lack thereof), which could help determine differential responses among participants.
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Other limitations include that the U.S. sample was from a small mid-eastern town
where the majority of the population holds conservative political and social views. Prior
research has indicated that conservative views serve to reduce/buffer death-related
anxiety and threat. Although no measure of political orientation was included in the
present study, it is possible that the political conservatism was a characteristic in this U.S.
sample that may have confounded the results.
Closer Examination of TMT
The lack of statistically significant evidence to support the basic tenants of TMT
in this study is an important finding. Our data is not the first to fail to support TMT, as
similar findings of non-significant results have been found, albeit few have been
published. This calls into question the reliability and universality of TMT. If the TMT
hypotheses of death anxiety and the dual component defensive processes are unique to all
humans and are characteristic of the human condition, then mortality salience effects
should be readily replicated in studies which follow a typical TMT experimental
procedure.
Future Directions
In light of the current study and lack of support for TMT predictions, a possible
direction for future research may be investigations to examine immediacy and duration of
mortality salience effects, specifically delay tasks (length of delay and type of delay or
distraction). TMT literature would likely benefit from future examination of the durations
in time that are required for defensive processes take in order to produce defensive
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reactions and for how long these long mortality salience effects last (minutes, hours,
days).
Further investigation into cross-cultural research, particularly with collectivist
cultures in warranted to test the universality of TMT and attempt to answer questions
central to the human condition. The exploration into alternative or additional mortality
salience inductions (e.g. collective mortality salience induction and/or subliminal
priming) to produce defensive reactions is an area of potential interest. Do defensive
reactions (both proximal and distal) manifest differently depending on ones’ culture? If
so, how should we alter the methods by which we measure defensive reactions according
to TMT? Related to culture and worldviews, there are likely to be different ways
individuals and cultures think about death. This is likely to engender different deathrelated thoughts and resultant anxiety about death (personal or collective). A question
remains whether the mortality salience manipulations that ask participants to think about
their death are sufficient to activate defensive processes across all religions. Finally, there
may be different aspects of the self that are activated during mortality salience inductions,
which may vary based on cultural differences. How does the role of self-concept affect
the mortality salience effects and can tests of Terror Management Theory account for this
possible role. The above musings and questions are potential areas of further
investigation.
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Appendix A
Measure of National Identification
Russia
1.
2.
3.
4.

I love Russia.
Other nations can learn a lot from us.
Being a Russian is an important part of my identity.
In today’s world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of our
nation.
5. It is important to me to contribute to my nation.
6. Russia has the best army in the world.
7. It is important to me to view myself as a Russian.
8. It is important to me that everyone will see me as a Russian.
9. It is disloyal for Russians to criticize Russia.
10. It is important for me to serve my country.
11. Russia is better than other nations in all respects.
12. When I talk about Russians, I usually say “we” rather than “they.”
13. There is generally a good reason for every rule and regulation made by our
national authorities.
U.S.
1.
2.
3.
4.

I love America.
Other nations can learn a lot from us.
Being an American is an important part of my identity.
In today’s world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of our
nation.
5. It is important to me to contribute to my nation.
6. The U.S. has the best army in the world.
7. It is important to me to view myself as an American.
8. It is important to me that everyone will see me as an American.
9. It is disloyal for Americans to criticize the U.S.
10. It is important for me to serve my country.
11. America is better than other nations in all respects.
12. When I talk about Americans, I usually say “we” rather than “they.”
13. There is generally a good reason for every rule and regulation made by our
national authorities.
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Appendix B
BELOW IS A LIST OF STATEMENTS DEALING WITH YOUR GENERAL
FEELINGS ABOUT YOURSELF. IF YOU STRONGLY AGREE, CIRCLE SA. IF YOU
AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT, CIRCLE A. IF YOU DISAGREE, CIRCLE D. IF
YOU STRONGLY DISAGREE, CIRCLE SD.
1.
STRONGLY
AGREE

2

3.

AGREE

DISAGREE

4.
STRONGLY
DISAGREE

1.

I feel that I'm a person of
worth, at least on an equal
plane with others.

SA

A

D

SD

2.

I feel that I have a number
of good qualities.

SA

A

D

SD

3.

All in all, I am inclined to
feel that I am a failure.

SA

A

D

SD

4.

I am able to do things as
well as most other people.

SA

A

D

SD

5.

I feel I do not have much to
be proud of.

SA

A

D

SD

6.

I take a positive attitude
toward myself.

SA

A

D

SD

7.

On the whole, I am satisfied
with myself.

SA

A

D

SD

8.

I wish I could have more
respect for myself.

SA

A

D

SD
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9.

I certainly feel useless at
times.

SA

A

D

SD

10.

At times I think I am no
good at all.

SA

A

D

SD

Ниже приведены высказывания, относящиеся к тому, как Вы обычно
чувствуете относительно себя. Если Вы совершенно согласны, обведите цифру
1, если согласны - 2, если не согласны - 3, если совершенно не согласны - 4

1. Я чувствую, что я
достойный человек, во
всяком случае, не хуже, чем
другие
2. Я чувствую, что у меня
много хороших качеств
3. Я склонен чувствовать,
что я неудачник
4. Я такой же способный,
как многие другие люди
5. Я чувствую, что у меня
не много оснований, чтобы
гордиться собой
6. Я положительно
отношусь к себе

Совершенно Согласен
согласен
1
2

Не
согласен
3

Совершенно
не согласен
4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

7. В целом, я удовлетворен
собой

1

2

3

4

8. Я хотел бы иметь
больше уважения к себе
9. Я чувствую бесполезным
веря от времени
10. Временами я чувствую,
что у меня нет ничего
хорошего

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4
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Appendix C
Level of Religiosity
1. How much does your religion provide meaning and purpose in your life?
2. How often do you ask for advice from a priest, pastor, or Holy person when you
have to take an important decision in life?
3. How often do you think about God?
4. How often do you pray?
5. How often do you attend a religious ceremony?
6. How often do you visit temples/churches?
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Appendix D
Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS)
Directions: This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and
emotions. Read each item and then circle the appropriate answer next to that word.
Indicate to what extent you have felt this way during the past week, including right now.
Use the following scale to record your answers.
(1) = Very slightly (2) = A little (3) = Moderately (4) = Quite a bit (5) = Extremely
or not at all
Very
Slightly or
Not at all

A Little

Moderately

Quite a Bit

Extremely

1.

Interested

1

2

3

4

5

2.

Distressed

1

2

3

4

5

3.

Excited

1

2

3

4

5

4.

Upset

1

2

3

4

5

5.

Strong

1

2

3

4

5

6.

Guilty

1

2

3

4

5

7.

Scared

1

2

3

4

5

8.

Hostile

1

2

3

4

5

9.

Enthusiastic

1

2

3

4

5

10. Proud

1

2

3

4

5

11. Irritable

1

2

3

4

5

12. Alert

1

2

3

4

5

13. Ashamed

1

2

3

4

5

14. Inspired

1

2

3

4

5

15. Nervous

1

2

3

4

5

16. Determined

1

2

3

4

5
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17. Attentive

1

2

3

4

5

18. Jittery

1

2

3

4

5

19. Active

1

2

3

4

5

20. Afraid

1

2

3

4

5

Инструкция: Этот опросник содержит описание различных чувств и эмоций. Прочитайте
каждое описание и обведите в какой мере Вы чувствовали себя в
последнюю неделю, включая сегодня
Совсем немного
или не
чувствовал

Немного

Умеренно

В большой
мере

В очень
большой
мере

1. Заинтересованным

1

2

3

4

5

2. В состоянии стресса

1

2

3

4

5

3. Радостным

1

2

3

4

5

4. Расстроенным

1

2

3

4

5

5. Сильным

1

2

3

4

5

6. Виноватым

1

2

3

4

5

7. Испуганным

1

2

3

4

5

8. Враждебным

1

2

3

4

5

9. Чувствовал
энтузиазм

1

2

3

4

5

10. Чувтвовал гордость

1

2

3

4

5

11. Раздражительным

1

2

3

4

5

12. Тревожным

1

2

3

4

5

13. Чувствовал стыд

1

2

3

4

5

14. Вдохновенным

1

2

3

4

5
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15. Нервозным

1

2

3

4

5

16. Решительным

1

2

3

4

5

17. Внимательным

1

2

3

4

5

18. Пугливым

1

2

3

4

5

19. Активным

1

2

3

4

5

20. Боящимся чего-то

1

2

3

4

5
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Appendix E
Essay Samples
Pro-American Essay
The first thing that I noticed when I came to this country was individual freedom enjoyed
by United States citizens. People are allowed to come and go as they please, excellent
education and job training programs are available, and the quality of life of for people in
this country is the best in the world. Even in areas where crime is prevalent, government
officials and law enforcement officers can be trusted to protect the rights of all
individuals. Even though the United States in the most powerful country in the world,
they go out of their way to promote fairness and democracy in other nations and will even
go to war to protect the rights of the citizens in foreign lands. I get angry when I hear
people who complain about or criticize the United States and its government because
clearly they have had the most profound positive effect on the world in general.
Anti-American Essay
When I first came to the United States, I arrived with the belief that it was the “land of
opportunity”, but I was wrong. I soon realized that opportunities are plentiful if you are
wealthy, but for persons of little means success is impossible. The only thing that people
care about in the United States is money and how they can achieve more wealth than
everyone else. There is no “brotherly love” here – instead, there is much prejudice people join together and dominate smaller groups and individuals. Americans hardly
think about the lives of foreigners unless those foreigners are identified as an enemy in
war. America is a cold country that is totally insensitive to the needs and special
problems of those who are new to this land – it thinks it is a great country but it is not.
Про-российский текст
Что отличает Россию от других стран – это ее люди с их невероятно глубоким
внутренним миром, который связан многими узами с Российской историей. В
России, люди способны на сердечное общение даже с теми людьми, с которыми
они только недавно познакомились. Гостеприимство – это визитная карточка
россиян. Гостям отдается все лучшее. Российская Федерация – это наболее
читающая страна, где много эрудированных людей.
Анти-российский текст
Русские - хмурые люди, ты не часто увидишь их улыбку на улице. Пьянство – это
большая проблема в России. Люди также не заботятся об экологии: большие
города загрязнены выхлопными газами и мусором. Больная проблема- коррупция.
Русские завидуют успеху других и не могут разделить счастье другого. Многи люди
нечестны и используют любые средста, чтобы достичь своей цели.
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Appendix F
Evaluation of Essay Author
Below are 30 words which describe personality characteristics. Please indicate your
impressions of the author of the essay that you just read by indicating how applicable each
of the following words seems to be to that individual. Place a number between 1 and 9 in
the space next to each word to indicate how much you feel that it characterizes the target
person. The numbers will indicate the following:
1
2
Not at all
applicable

3

4

5
6
moderately
applicable

7

8

Rigid

______

Patient

______

Honest

______

Arrogant

______

Flexible

______

Argumentative

______

Likeable

______

Patriotic

______

Intelligent

______

Warm

______

Reliable

______

Snobbish

______

Contemptible

______

Obnoxious

______

Tolerant

______

Weak-Minded

______

Stable

______

Self-Centered

______

Knowledgeable

______

Hypocritical

______

Rational

______

Generous

______

Kind

______

Biased

______

Insensitive

______

Ungrateful

______

Logical

______

Naïve

______

Ignorant

______

Opinionated

______

9
extremely
applicable

Overall, how positively or negatively do you feel about the author? __________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Negatively
Positively
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Пожалуйста, прочитайте следующий текст. После этого, оцените автора этого текста.
Что отличает Россию от других стран – это ее люди с их невероятно глубоким внутренним
миром, который связан многими узами с Российской историей. В России, люди способны
на сердечное общение даже с теми людьми, с которыми они только недавно
познакомились. Гостеприимство – это визитная карточка россиян. Гостям отдается все
лучшее. Российская Федерация – это наболее читающая страна, где много эрудированных
людей.
Ниже приведены 30 слов, которые описывают личностные характеристики. Пожалуйста,
укажите ваше впечатление об авторе теста, который вы сейчас прочитали. Для этого
прочитайте слова, приведенные ниже и укажите, в какой степени эти слова характеризуют
автора текста. Для этого поставьте число от 1 до 9 рядом с каждым словом.
1

2

3

4

Совешенно не подходит

5

6

7

8

в какой-то
мере подходит

9
очень подходит

Ригидный

Терпеливый

Честный

Высокомерный

Гибкий

Любящий спорить

Приятный

Патриотичный

Умный

Душевный

Надежный

Сноб

Презирающий

Неприятный

Терпимый

Без определенного мнения

Стабильный

Эгоистичный

Знающий

Лицемерный

Рациональный

Щедрый

Добрый

Необъективный

Нечувствительный

Неблагодарный

Логичный

Наивный

Невежественный

Чрезмерно самоуверенный

В целом как вы чувствовали относительно автора прочитанного текса (обведите
соответствующую цифру):
1
2
Негативно

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
позитивно
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